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TREATIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
ISAO SATO*
INTRODUCTION
Problems of the validity of treaties in a constitutional order concern
aspects of both international and constitutional law. The chief concern
of this article, however, is the effect of the Japanese Supreme Court's
power of judicial review upon the validity of treaties in domestic law.
The relationship of treaties and the Constitution long has been a
favorite theme of Japanese international law scholars. Under the new
Constitution it has become an urgent and unavoidable issue for con-
stitutional law scholars as well; the present constitution, unlike the
Meiji Constitution, has provisions, (Articles 81 and 98), which bear
directly upon the problem.
Much of the recent discussion of the problem has been stimulated
by the so-called "Sunakawa Case,"'- involving the United States-Jap-
anese Mutual Security Treaty. This treaty has been the subject of
heated political dispute between the parties of the government and
the Socialist opposition, and in the Sunakawa case, the defendants
asserted its unconstitutionality under Article 9.2 The Tokyo District
Court held the treaty unconstitutional,3 but its decision was reversed
on appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Sunakawa case is a leading case on the review of treaties; it also
illustrates that at the present time, with a short twenty year history,
the constitutional issues presented by treaty review are not separable
from the political overtones of the controversies in which they have thus
far arisen. This caveat is particularly in order when evaluating the
schools of thought embodied in academic commentaries on the problem.
The main purpose of the following treatment is to offer fresh, prac-
tical approaches to this problem rather than to review theoretical and
* Professor of Law, Sophia University, Tokyo.
'Japan v. Sakata, 13 Saik6saibansho keiji hanreishil [hereinafter cited Keishii] 3225
(Sup. Ct. G.B., Dec. 16, 1959).
'Article 9 provides:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes
2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
'The decision appears in 13 Keishu 3305 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., March 30, 1959).
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academic ones. The matter shall be treated by discussing: (1) the
situation which existed under the Meiji Constitution; (2) the situation
under the present constitution; (3) underlying theoretical and inter-
pretative issues; and (4) the Sunakawa decision. A detailed study of
the political question doctrine, one of the important points in the Sun-
akawa decision, appears in Chief Justice Yokota's article in this sym-
posium.4
I. THE SITUATION UNDER THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION
The 1889 Meiji Constitution mentioned treaties only in Article 13:
"The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties."
Thus no provision directly considered the validity of treaties in domes-
tic law. However, in the opinion of the government, treaties had
domestic validity upon promulgation by the Emperor. The official
opinion of the Japanese government on the domestic validity of
treaties was represented in its answer to an inquiry from the Govern-
ment of Holland in 1906:5
Even if the treaty contains matters of the same nature as law, it can be
concluded in Japan without the consent of the Diet. And it is the inter-
pretation of the Japanese government that such treaties have legal force
as a part of domestic law by their promulgation. It is not necessary to
insert them into the law of the land through legislation, and the pro-
visions of laws and ordinances contradictory to the treaties are to be
regarded as changed automatically ....
However, when the signatory powers promise in the treaty that
they have to supplement their domestic systems of law, it becomes
naturally the responsibility of each power to enact legislation, in accor-
dance with such a provision, to accomplish the purpose of that particular
treaty ....
The basic thesis of this official opinion is stated in its first para-
graph. Article 13 of the Meiji Constitution provided for the conclusion
of treaties as a prerogative of the Emperor and did not require the
'See pp. 1036-45 supra.5Quoted in Y. TAKANO, KEMP6 TO J6YAKU (Constitution and treaty) 128 (1960).
The inquiry was as follows:
"In what way and form shall the treaties have legal force or validity?" "Shall
the provisions of a treaty which is appropriately concluded and is, when neces-
sary. approved by the Diet, have legal force or validity for the courts, govern-
mental officials and peoples at once after the exchange or the deposition of the
instrument of ratification? Shall any prior law be necessary for the admission
of the provisions of treaties into the domestic order of law, according to the
academic theory that the ratification of signatory powers means only the promise
to make the provisions of treaty fit for each one's own legal system?"
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participation of the Diet; at the same time Articles 8 and 9 gave the
Emperor power to issue Imperial Ordinances independently, without
the concurrence of the Diet. Therefore it was consistent with the do-
mestic legal system for a treaty, concluded by the Emperor's preroga-
tive power without the participation of the Diet, to have domestic
legal force.6
A further question raised under the Meiji Constitution was whether it
was possible for a treaty to be unconstitutional. The usual theory was
that it was not possible, since the power to conclude treaties was dele-
gated to the Emperor by the Constitution itself. This of course was con-
sistent with the Meiji Constitution's principle of "rule by law," which
did not provide for judicial review of legislation's constitutionality.
Such discussion of constitutionality as did occur took place in the
Privy Council. Occasionally there was heated debate in the Council
over constitutionality. An outstanding example was the so-called "No-
War" Treaty (General Treaty for the Renunciation of War) of 1927.7
Article 1 of this treaty provided:
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national
policy in their relations with one another.
A strong opinion was voiced in the Privy Council insisting that the
words "in the names of their respective peoples," contradicted Article
13 of the Meiji Constitution and invaded the Emperor's prerogatives.
The same opinion was voiced in the Diet by those opposing the Gov-
ernment. Though this opinion was not officially advanced to the Em-
peror by the Privy Council, the government was forced into a difficult
situation by the objection.
As a result, the government issued a Declaration on June 27, 1929,
stating that it was the Japanese government's understanding that the
words "in the names of their respective peoples" would not be appli-
cable to Japan due to the provision in the Imperial Constitution. The
Emperor ratified and promulgated the treaty with the above declara-
tion included.8
'See S. Hayashi, Jayaku no kokunaihj4 no k.ryoku ni tsuite (On the domestic
validity of treaties), H6GAYU xy6SHITsU (No. 7) 34, 35 (1963). Mr. Hayashi was,
when he wrote this article, the Director of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau.
'Kellogg Briand Pact (signed 27 Aug. 1927).
'It seems doubtful that such an interpretation of the words "in the names of
their respective peoples" is proper. At that time, the discussions took place in the
academic field. The precise details are omitted here. However, in my opinion, the
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II. THE NEW SITUATION UNDER THE 1946 CONSTITUTION
The 1946 Constitution of Japan produced a new situation. Aside
from the declaration of peace and international cooperation in the Pre-
amble, and the renunciation of war in Article 9, many provisions re-
lating to treaties are found in the constitution.9 But the problem of
judicial review of treaties revolves around Articles 81 and 98. These
provide:
Art. 81. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation, or official
act.
Art. 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no
law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part
thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or
validity.
2. The treaties concluded by Japan and the established laws of nations
shall be faithfully observed.
The obvious questions raised by these provisions are: (1) Why does
Article 81 not include treaties as objects of judicial review? (2) What
does Article 98, paragraph 2 mean? Before attempting to detail the
interpretation of these two articles it is important to detail the process
of their formation and to outline their practical operation."a
A. Article 81
Article 73 of the MacArthur Draft, which was the origin of present
Article 81, provided;"
words "in the means of the respective peoples" should probably be regarded as
rhetorical, expressing the will of each signatory power; thus the word "people"
has no relation to the distinction between monarch and people. Consequently it has
no relation to the issue of who has the power to declare war and to conclude treaties
in the domestic constitutional structure of each party to this treaty. As the above
example suggests, constitutionality of treaties under the Meiji Constitution de-
pended solely upon the judgment and self-restraint of the political organs such as
the Privy Council, and was not properly a matter for judicial determination.
'For example the ratification and promulgation of treaties are powers of the
Emperor (Art. 7(1)); conclusion of treaties is the function of the Cabinet, with the
prior or subsequent approval of the Diet (Arts. 61, 73(3)).
" These aspects are also treated in Keuzp5 Chisakai hizkokusho fiu.okn bunsho
No. 2 (Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 2)
KiEMPO CHOSAKAI, KE2,1P6 SEITEI NO KEIKA NI KANSURU SHO-IIKAI HOKOKUSH6
(Commission on the Constitution, Report of the committee relating to the history of
the adoption of the Constitution) (1964) ; Kemp6 chisakai hkokusho fliroku bunsho
No. 5 (Report of the Commission on the Constitution, Attached Document No. 5)
KEMP6 CH6SAKI, KEMP6 UNYv NO JISSAI NI TSUITE NO H6KOKUSHO (Commission
on the Constitution, Report of the third committee relating to the actual applica-
tion of the Constitution) (1964).
" Quoted in Kemp5 Chcsakai hokokusho fu;;oku bunsho No. 2, supra note 10, at
723.
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The Supreme Court is the court of last resort. Where the determina-
tion of the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act
is in question, the judgment of the Supreme Court in all cases arising
under or involving Chapter III of this Constitution is final; in all other
cases where determination of the constitutionality of any law, ordinance,
regulation or official act is in question, the judgment of the Court is
subject to review by the Diet.
A judgment of the Supreme Court which is subject to review may be
set aside only by the concurring vote of two-thirds of all of the represen-
tatives of the Diet. The Diet shall establish rules of procedure for re-
viewing decisions of the Supreme Court.
The idea of review of the Supreme Court's judgment by the Diet was
unique, and was omitted from the draft of March 6, 1946.
In the Diet, discussions concerning the validity of treaties in domes-
tic law and the relation between the Constitution and treaties cen-
tered around this Article and Article 98. Representing the government,
Mr. Tokujir6 Kanamori, Minister of State, stated the official inter-
pretation that the validity of treaties in domestic law was not changed
by the provisions of the new Constitution. Kanimori explained that the
new Constitution was not intended to regulate conflict between the
Constitution and treaties in international law, because the validity of
treaties in international law should not be determined by only one
signatory power. Rather, their validity should be determined by the
treaties' actual operation. But since the state must establish its own
domestic system of law, and since no treaty contrary to the Constitu-
tion can be executed when it impinges upon domestic law, treaties do
occupy a lower status than the Constitution.
The government has continued to maintain that the Constitution
occupies a higher status than treaties in domestic law, emphasizing
that the procedure for concluding treaties is easier than the procedure
for amending the Constitution. 2 With respect to "the established laws
of nations" the government has indicated its view that in so far as
Japan is subject to the fundamental principles of international society,
it intends to follow them; the government maintains there could never
be contradiction between the Constitution and such principles.
The government also has continuously maintained that the purpose
of Article 81 is to guarantee the superiority of the Constitution over all
the nation's laws, including treaties. Even though the word "treaties"
does not appear in Article 81, treaties are to be subject to judicial
'
2See Article 96.
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review. An analogy may be drawn to the regulations of local govern-
mental bodies, which many court decisions have held to be subject to
judicial review, even though such regulations are not explicitly in-
cluded as an object of review under Article 81, and presumably must
be subsumed under the generic heading "official act."
B. Article 98
Article 98 of the MacArthur Draft provided:13
This Constitution and the laws and treaties made in pursuance hereof
shall be the supreme law of the nation, and no public law or ordinance
and no imperial rescript or other governmental act, or part thereof, con-
trary to the provisions hereof shall have legal force or validity.
This provision remained as it was, except for a small change in the
wording, in the draft constitutions of March 6 and April 17, 1946.
The most important point to be noted is that not only "the Constitu-
tion" but also "the laws and treaties made in pursuance hereof" were
made the supreme law. Clearly the writers of the MacArthur Draft
relied on article 6 paragraph 2 of the United States Constitution. How-
ever, the United States article also was intended to establish the su-
premacy of federal law, and to that extent has no applicability to
Japan's centralized political system. The House of Representatives
therefore omitted the words "and the laws and treaties made in pur-
suance hereof" and added instead the present second paragraph pro-
viding for the faithful observation of "the treaties and established laws
of nations."
There are two further reasons why the House adopted the latter
formulation. First, the Constitution was inadequate without a provi-
sion concerning the relationship between the Constitution and treaties.
Second, according to Mr. Hitoshi Ashida's report to the plenary ses-
sion,1" it was necessary for Japan to make clear in the new Constitution
a strong determination to respect international law in the future. At the
time of its adoption, the government, particularly the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, understood that to be the intention of the amendment.
During proceedings of the Commission on the Constitution, Mr.
Kumao Nishimura," representing the authority of the Ministry of
"Quoted in Kempo chosakai hokokusho fitoko bunsho No. 2, supra note 10, at
719.
"Kemp3 chsakai hikokusho ftnoku bunsho No. 5, supra note 10, at 284.
"Mr. Nishimura formerly was the Director of the Bureau of Treaties, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.
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Foreign Affairs, testified that one purpose of Article 98(2) was to
recognize the domestic validity of treaties and international laws;
another purpose was to emphasize Japan's high degree of respect for
international law. Article 98 must be interpreted with respect to this
political background. 6
The legislative history and the official government interpretation of
Articles 81 and 98 has been traced above. The Court's view was made
clear in the well-known Sunakawa decision.' It was there held that a
treaty featuring extreme political considerations and bearing upon the
very existence of the country as a sovereign power, is outside the
scope of judicial review, unless it is patently unconstitutional.' Pre-
sumably then the Supreme Court believed treaties to be subject to the
Constitution; except for treaties of a highly political nature, treaties
are subject to judicial review as well. The present view of the Supreme
Court thus coincides with the view consistently put forth by the gov-
ernment.
III. THEORETICAL ISSUES
A. The Validity of Treaties in Domestic and International Law
As international rules, treaties find their validity in international
law. The problem of such validity is outside the scope of a constitu-
tion. When a treaty is subjected to constitutional review by a domes-
tic court, the effect of the judgment is upon the validity of the treaty
in domestic law. It is not doubted that review of the validity of
treaties in international law is not a proper function for a domestic
court.
Generally, the validity of treaties in international law is terminated
only when the signatory states so agree. If a court does decide that
the domestic application of a certain treaty is unconstitutional, the
government is under an obligation to do its best to cure the defect.
This inconsistent treatment of treaties in domestic and international
law is an undesirable outgrowth of the present state of development of
international society, but must be recognized. 9
OKenzpa chsaki hkokusho fuzoku bmisho No. 5, supra note 10, at 184.
'Japan v. Sakata, 13 Keishfi 3225 (Sup. Ct., G. B., Dec. 16, 1959).l"Id. at 3234-35.
" M. IT6, KEMPO NO KENKYU (Studies on the Constitution) 226 (1965). Kurota,
Joyaku no ikenshinsaken no genkai (Limits of the constitutional review of treaties),
JuRIsuTo (Special issue on Sunakawa case) 57 (Jan. 1960).
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B. The Admission of Treaties into the Domestic Legal Order
Upon ratification by the parties, treaties are valid in international
law, but they are not necessarily valid and enforceable in domestic
law. For under the present regime of international law, the constitu-
tion of each state determines the legal status of treaties in domestic
law. The constitution of each state also determines what, if any, ad-
ditional legislation is necessary after conclusion or promulgation to
give treaties validity in domestic law.
A complete comparative constitutional survey of this issue will not
be attempted here.2' But a typical example of a constitutional system
which does not give treaties automatic validity in domestic law is that
of England. There the Crown concludes treaties without the consent
of Parliament and treaties do not of themselves have validity in do-
mestic law. Where the treaties relate to the rights and duties of the
people or place financial burdens upon the state, they are enforced
in the country only after Parliament has enacted enabling legislation.
Such legislation is usually passed after the signing and before the
ratification of treaties.
Under a constitutional system such as England's, the question of
the domestic validity of a treaty in the face of a conflict with the con-
stitution or another law is never raised. The courts can deal only with
the laws established to execute the treaties; they do not deal directly
with the treaties. This is so even if the treaties are self-executing, as
will be explained below.2'
In many other constitutional systems, treaties themselves are given
validity in domestic law, that is, they become enforceable as domestic
law upon their promulgation. It is not a matter of concern whether a
specific provision in the constitution so provides. There may be in-
stances in which domestic legislation is enacted to enforce treaties,
but these are supplementary, not necessary, measures for the enforce-
ment of treaties.
Japan adopted the latter system under both the Meiji and the pres-
ent constitutions. Indeed, there is a trend toward such constitutional
systems. Most of these systems require the participation of parliament
in the conclusion of treaties. However, such participation bears no
necessary relationship to the treaties' self-executing nature. For exam-
ple, under the Meiji Constitution the participation of the Imperial
On the precise issues see Y. TAKANO, su pra note 5, at 118 et seq.
21 See text pp. 1071-73 infra.
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Diet was not permitted, but treaties were given validity in domestic
law upon promulgation by the Emperor. 2 On the other hand, the
Constitution of Spain requires legislation to enforce treaties internally,
in spite of the fact that the approval of Parliament is necessary to
conclude treaties.
The Japanese Constitution's provision on promulgation of treaties
does not expressly provide that promulgation shall give the treaties
validity in domestic law. However, Article 98, paragraph 2, provides
for the faithful observance of treaties. It may be assumed that the
treaties have validity in domestic law upon promulgation.
C. The So-Called "Constitutional Supremacy" and "Treaty
Supremacy" Theories
The opposing theories of "Constitutional Supremacy" and "Treaty
Supremacy" dominate discussion in Japanese academic circles today.
Many treatises on the Constitution explain and compare these two
theories and endeavor to determine which is correct. The majority and
minority opinions of the Supreme Court in the Sunakawa decision mir-
ror this debate in the academic field. But in the writer's opinion, a
careful interpretation of the Constitution will indicate that the ration-
ale of the Treaty Supremacy theory is faulty.
Proponents of the Treaty Supremacy theory rely principally on
Article 98, paragraph 2. They assert that even unconstitutional treaties
should be faithfully observed and enforced as domestic law. As the
proponents of the Constitutional Supremacy theory point out, how-
ever, the relative status of constitution and treaties cannot be inferred
from Article 98, paragraph 2. Rather that article is only a recognition
that Japan will not neglect its treaty obligations under international
law and that treaties will be given validity in domestic law.
Proponents of the Treaty Supremacy theory also look to Article
81, which does not specifically include treaties as objects of judicial
review. They argue that the Article is meant to exclude treaties as
objects of judicial review, and that this in turn indicates that treaties
occupy a higher status than the Constitution. But that is a non sequi-
tur, for the question of judicial review is separable from the question
of the supremacy of treaties or constitution. Thus if treaties are to be
excluded from judicial review, this might equally well indicate that
determination of their constitutionality should be left to the political
'See text pp. 1058-59 supra.
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branches of government. Article 99, which requires all Ministers of
State and members of the Diet to respect and uphold the Constitution,
would lend further support to the latter interpretation.
Having no solid foundation for their theory in the provisions of the
Constitution, proponents of the Treaty Supremacy theory have turned
to the principle of international cooperation allegedly implicit in the
Constitution. Thus they argue that, even recognizing the Constitution
to be the fundamental expression of national sovereignty, it is faith-
ful to its principle of international cooperation to give treaties, as the
law of international society, higher status than the Constitution. Al-
though this reason seems to be a positive one, it has been criticized on
two grounds. First, if that had been the intention, the rigid special
procedure required for amendment of the Constitution would have
been unreasonable; amendment is more difficult than treaty ratifica-
tion. Second, such a rationale undercuts the principle of national
sovereignty, a cornerstone of the Constitution, without any explicit
constitutional authority for doing so.
The discussions of the two schools of thought in Japan have pro-
duced an abstract, pedantic theory. But what the problem of judicial
review of treaties demands is a mature theory for interpreting positive
law.
IV. THE SUNAKAWA DECISION
The Sunakawa decision is the only Supreme Court decision dealing
directly with Article 9 of the Constitution, which is beyond question
the most important and controversial article in the present constitu-
tion. Consequently, the case is one of the most important to arise
under the new Constitution.23
The so-called Sunakawa decision was the catalyst for extensive aca-
demic discussion of the relationship between the Constitution and the
validity of treaties. Furthermore it was important because it distin-
guished between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties, a dis-
tinction which has not always been clearly maintained.
The Sunakawa incident occurred on July 8, 1957, at Tachikawa Air
Base in the village of Sunakawa. A group of demonstrators protesting
the extension of a runway at the air base trespassed on the base, knock-
'The complete translation into English of the Reason (Majority opinion), sup-
plementary opinions, and other opinions is contained in J. MAKI, COURT AND
CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN, SELECTED SUPREME COURT DEcisiONs, 1948-60, 298 (1964).
On my general comment and criticism on this decision, see 2 I. SAT6, KEMP6
KAISIIAKU NO SHONIONDAI (Issues on constitutional interpretation) 95 (1962).
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ing down a boundary fence. Seven of these Japanese were charged
under a law prohibiting entry without good reason into an area or
installation utilized by the United States Armed Forces. 4 The ques-
tion whether the United States-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty itself
was unconstitutional became the basic issue. The Supreme Court re-
versed a Tokyo District Court decision which had ruled that the de-
fendants were not guilty. The Tokyo District Court reasoned that by
sanctioning the retention of United States Armed Forces in Japan the
Japanese government was maintaining a war potential, forbidden by
Article 9, paragraph 2. Holding the government's action sanctioning
retention of the United States forces to be unconstitutional, the court
stated that the implementing law under which the defendants were
charged was in contravention of Article 31 of the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall suffer a criminal penalty "except accord-
ing to procedure established by law." This opinion is the so-called
"Date Decision.1
25
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court decision. But rather
than accepting the arguments on appeal of either party,26 it held that
24 The charge was under article 2 of Nipponkoku to amerika-gasshikoku to no
aiwen hosh joyaku daisan-j6 ni inotozuku gyaseikyatei ni tomonau keiji-tokubet-
sulho (Special criminal act accompanying the Administrative Agreement based on
article 3 of the Japan-United States Security Treaty) (Law No. 138, 1952). The title
of the statute was changed in 1960 by Law No. 102, as a result of the amendment to
the Treaty, but the substance still remains the same.
-Regarding my general comment and criticism on this decision, see I. SAT6, supra
note 23, at 78.
The Date Decision purported to avoid direct consideration of the constitution-
ality of the Security Treaty itself by judging directly only the unconstitutionality
of the action of the Japanese Government.
However, as the Supreme Court decision later said, a judgment about whether
the action of the Japanese Government in retaining the United States Armed Forces
is unconstitutional has as its underlying premise the answer to a prior question;
whether the content of the said treaty is in contravention of the constitutional pro-
visions. Thus while the Date Decision did not formally purport to judge the Secur-
ity Treaty unconstitutional, such was its practical effect. K. Yokota, Joyaku no
Ikenshinsaken-Suakawa Janketsu o chilshin to shite (Judicial power of constitu-
tional review of treaties-centering around the Sunakawa decision) 73 KOKKA
GAKKAI ZASSHI (No. 7) 1, 4 (1960).
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor argued that since the word
"treaties" is clearly omitted from Article 81, and because Article 98, paragraph 2,
provides for the faithful observation of treaties, treaties shall be 6utside the scope
of judicial review. The brief continued:
This does not mean that the Constitution permits the conclusion of the un-
constitutional treaties .... [T]he Constitution leaves the determination of the
constitutionality of treaties to the Cabinet and the Diet, the highest political
organs of the state, in consideration of the nature of treaties and the character
and function of the court.... Since treaties are outside the scope of judicial
review, it is beyond question that the action of the Government which, as
prescribed in the original judgment, sanctions the retention of the United States
Armed Forces, is outside the scope of judicial review.
13 Keishfr at 3303.
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treaties which have a highly political nature, not treaties in general,
fall outside the scope of judicial review: 2 7
The Security Treaty in the present case must be regarded as having a
highly political nature which, as was pointed out above, possesses an
extremely important relation to the basis of the existence of our coun-
try as a sovereign nation. There are not a few points in which a legal
decision as to the unconstitutionality of its content is simply the other
side of the coin of the political or discretionary decision of the cabinet,
which concluded the treaty, or the National Diet, which gave its consent
to it. Consequently, the legal decision as to unconstitutionality has a
character which, as a matter of principle, is not adapted to review by ajudicial court, which has as its mission a purely judicial function. It
accordingly falls outside the power of judicial review by the court,
unless unconstitutionality or invalidity is patent. It is proper to inter-
pret the matter as one that must be entrusted primarily to the decision
of the cabinet, which possesses a power to conclude treaties, and of the
National Diet, which has the power to approve them; and it ultimately
must be left to the political review of the sovereign people. Thus, this
matter is not concerned either with the unconstitutionality of the Se-
curity Treaty or with the actions of the government that are based on
the treaty or with whether the case is one in which [the treaty] has
become a basic premise, as in the present case.
Defendant's lawyer answered the Constitution must be given higher status than
treaties, giving six underlying reasons:
(1) An interpretation permitting the conclusion of unconstitutional treaties
gives the treaties higher status than the Constitution, and is contradictory to
article 99, which establishes the obligation of the Cabinet to respect and uphold
the Constitution.
(2) If treaties were given higher status than the Constitution, the Constitution,
which is particularly difficult to amend in its own wording, could be amended
in practice by the easy procedure of concluding treaties. [Without a special,
clear provision, such as article 54 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of
France], it is not possible to realize through the conclusion of treaties the same
results intended to be realized through amendment of the Constitution.
(3) Article 98, paragraph 2, does not refer to the question of the superiority or
the inferiority of the validity of treaties and the Constitution. Its purpose is
only to recognize the validity of treaties in domestic law.(4) The premise of the opinion insisting on the higher status of treaties is the
respect for the principle of international coordination embodied in the Con-
stitution. However, the Japan-United States Security Treaty is precisely con-
tradictory to this principle because substantially it is a treaty of military
alliance.
(5) Any interpretation holding the view that the Constitution has higher status
than treaties and, at the same time, insisting that treaties are beyond judicial
review, either on the grounds that the word "treaties" is omitted from article
81 or on the grounds of the theory of Political Question, is logically self-
contradictory.
(6) In domestic law, treaties have the same validity as municipal laws. The
power of judicial review therefore can also be exercised on treaties. Though
the word "treaties" is omitted from article 81, a treaty is an "official act."
13 Keishfi.
Id. at 3234-35.
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The decision then considered whether the Security Treaty was "pa-
tently unconstitutional or invalid" and judged that "such retention of
the United States Armed Forces must certainly be in accord with the
intent of Article 9, of Article 98, paragraph 2, and of the Preamble of
the Constitution." 28
To a final contention that the Administrative Agreement,29 which the
special criminal act,30 implements, was unconstitutional because the
consent of the Diet had not been obtained,3' the Court replied that the
agreement was within the scope of article 3 of the ratified treaty. 2
The Court also pointed out the fact that the House of Representatives
had rejected a resolution that the government obtain the Diet's consent
to the Administrative Agreement. 33
Although the Court agreed unanimously upon the proper judgment,
it should be noted that no fewer than ten justices differed in varying
degrees over the issues raised by the case. Disputes over the nature of
the power of constitutional review of treaties and other "acts of gov-
ernment" and of "political questions" are of special significance. Three
justices presented minority opinions.3" They insisted that all treaties,
including treaties having a highly political nature, should be subject to
judicial review. Thus reaching the merits, they judged the treaty con-
stitutional.
The minority opinions first disposed of the contention that the
treaty's validity presented a political question, and was therefore not
reviewable. Justice Kotani wrote as follows:3'
It goes without saying that not only among treaties but among laws as
well many are of great importance to the existence of our country and
consequently have a high political content. Would the Majority Opinion
say that in the case of these, as well as treaties, the exercise of the right
of constitutional review is limited only to cases of patent unconstitu-
tionality? If not, then it is clear that the logic is inconsistent. [Ac-
" Id. at 3235-36.
' Nipponkoku to amerika-gasshkoku to no aida no anzen hoshr05 jyjyaku daisan-
Jo ni vnotoimtku gyoseikytei (Administrative Agreement based on article 3 of the
Japan-United States Security Treaty), which came into effect on April 28, 1952(signed on February 28, 1952). This agreement was replaced by Treaty No. 7, June
23, 1960, which preserves the same basic contents.
=' See note 24 supra.
"
1 JAPANESE CoNsr. arts. 61, 73(3).
2- 13 Keishii at 3236.
I!d.
These opinions were by Justices Katsushige Kotani, Ken'ichi Okuno, and
Kiyoshi Takahashi. They appear in 13 Keishfi at 3268-86.
Id. at 3275-77.
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cording to the majority opinion] the right of constitutional review is in
the position of being completely unable to touch on important national
affairs. (What is termed "patent unconstitutionality and invalidity" in
the majority opinion is something which, by and large, does not exist.
It exists only in name.) I believe that [the majority's view] threatens
the very foundations of our system of the separation of powers ....
Again, the phrase "patent unconstitutionality and invalidity" has been
taken to mean "unconstitutional and invalid as can immediately be under-
stood by anyone." But can there ever be a defect that is unconstitutional
and invalid as can be immediately understood by anyone in a treaty
that has been concluded through the pooling of intellects over a long
period and has been approved by the wisdom of many? In short, the
majority opinion can be considered as nothing more than a self-con-
soling excuse regarding the right of constitutional review. Accordingly,
the final position of the majority opinion is the same as saying that the
right of constitutional review does not extend to treaties.
The minority opinions then supported their own position by compar-
ing the procedure for amending the Constitution with the procedure for
concluding treaties. 6 Finally, since treaties as well as laws are given
domestic validity, the minority justices argued that treaties should be
subsumed under the term "the laws" in Article 81. For example, Jus-
tices Okuno and Takahashi, in their joint opinion, wrote as follows: 37
In essence, treaties are contracts in international law between nation and
nation, but at the same time there are cases in which treaties in them-
selves possess validity in domestic law, and cases in which they are im-
plemented through the separate enactment of domestic law. We inter-
pret the situation as follows: in cases in which treaties in themselves
possess binding force over the people as domestic law, their validity as
domestic law, as a matter of principle, stands in a position beneath the
Constitution, the supreme law; these cases, like domestic law, become
the object of so-called constitutional review by the courts under article
81. It is the same when treaties are judged as premises in suits....
On the other hand, there are those who hold that because the word
"treaty" does not appear in the above article 81, the courts have no
power of constitutional review over treaties. Even granting that the
courts adjudge a treaty unconstitutional, that only denies the validity of
the treaty as domestic law and does not deny its validity in international
law, wherein it would still be valid; ... the courts do not review or
judge the validity of treaties under international law. [That is the rea-
son] that the word "treaty" was not inserted in article 81; that article
is not to be understood as having the intent of denying to the courts the
right of judicial review of the validity of treaties in domestic law .... In
" Id. at 3273, 3281.
3 Id. at 3280-81.
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this sense, the proper interpretation is that treaties are included in the
"laws" of article 81. In the same way the proper interpretation is that
treaties are included as domestic law in the "laws" of article 76, para-
graph 3, and article 98, paragraph 1, of the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION: A NEED FOR MEANINGFUL DIsTINcTIoNs
The viewpoint expressed above fails to make necessary distinctions 
8
The first distinction is that the Court has the power of constitutional
review over treaties only in so far as they are effective as domestic law
rather than as international law. The second distinction is between
self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. Non-self-executing
treaties cannot originally be applied by the Court, and are not ori-
ginally subject to judicial review. This distinction between self-exe-
cuting and non-self-executing treaties is central to any proper inter-
pretation of Article 81. 31
Self-executing treaties are those whose contents are enforceable as
internal law without further legislation."0 This concept was established
by court decisions under article 6, paragraph 2, of the United States
Constitution. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Foster v. Neilson:4
Our constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, con-
sequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of
the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision.
Marshall distinguished "a treaty provision that operates of itself"
from "a stipulation that a particular act shall be performed, in which
case the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a
rule for the court." Such a "stipulation" renders a treaty non-self-
executing. The treaty then has no validity in domestic law and is not
applied by the court. Only the laws enforcing such a treaty are subject
to constitutional review.
The above analysis could be applied to Article 81 of the Constitu-
tion of Japan, even though Article 81 does not directly deal with the
s' See S. Kurota, supra note 19, at 58.
See id.; M. IT6 supra note 19; K. Hashimoto 15yakit to iken rippo shinsaken
(Treaties and the judicial power of constitutional review), KIIKAN H6RITSUGAKU
(Jurisprudence quarterly) (No. 28) (1960) ; T. Fujita, Jayaku no gokensei (The con-
stitutionality of treaties), 4 J6CHI H6GAKU (Sophia Journal of law) (No. 2) (1960).
"Although the minority opinions in the Sunakawa case adopt this interpretation,
only Justice Kotani delineates between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties
with sufficient clarity. 13 Keishfi at 3270. There is another interpretation which
tries to affirm the judicial review on treaties by involving the treaties in "the
regulations" in Article 81. But it is unnecessary to adopt this interpretation.
"
12 Pet 253 (1929).
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judicial review of treaties. Self-executing treaties are similar to other
domestic laws, and in this regard they are naturally included in "the
laws." And with regard to non-self-executing treaties, only the laws
established for enforcing them, not the treaties themselves, become
objects of judicial review.
But where the constitutionality of laws executing a non-self-exe-
cuting treaty is to be judged, a question arises as to whether the court
can exercise the power of judicial review on the treaty itself as a neces-
sary premise of the judgment. Views are divided on this point, which
was central to the Date Decision in the Sunakawa case. For example,
Professor Kurota denies the courts' ability to reach the question, since
such a treaty has of itself no validity in domestic law.42 So also does
Professor Miyazawa: "
The court is not authorized to exercise the power of judicial review on
treaties in the way which, through the exercise of the power on laws
and ordinances, makes the result the same as judicial review of treaties
themselves.
But against these views, Professor It6 affirms the judgment of the
Court on the treaty as a basic premise as follows:"
[S]ince treaties are of a highly political character, the court must be
very careful in judging their unconstitutionality. However, even so, the
judgment of the constitutionality of a treaty, when logically necessary as
a basic premise [of a decision upon the laws executing it] should not
be precluded in the name of a "Political Question."
According to this view Professor t6 supports the Date Decision in
the Sunakawa case:"
The Date Decision did not directly judge the Security Treat), itself
unconstitutional. It considered the constitutional validity of the Security
Treaty as a basic premise, which as a practical matter made clear the
unconstitutionality of the Special Criminal Law, a domestic law for
enforcing the Security Treaty.
A final point is in order. As has been widely said, the Court ought
to be extremely cautious in judging a treaty unconstitutional. It has
been frequently noted that there is not a single example in the history
of the United States of the Supreme Court declaring a self-executing
12S. Kurota, supra note 19, at 59.
'T. MIYAZAWA, NIHONKOitJ KEMP6 (The Constitution of Japan) 672 (1955).
"M. IT6, supra note 19 at 235-36.
"Id. And see 2 I. SAT6, supra note 23, at 90.
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treaty unconstitutional. The court usually avoids the judgment of un-
constitutionality either by invoking the "political question" doctrine
or by construing the treaty so as to save its constitutionality. 6 An
equally circumspect approach by the Japanese Supreme Court may
eventually do the most to strengthen a tradition of judicial review.
' However, the United States Supreme Court did recently hold part of an execu-
tive agreement unconstitutional. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
On this decision see K. TAKAYANAGi, TENN6, KEMP6 DAI KYT-J6 (Emperor,
Article 9 of the Constitution) 184 (1963). Professor Takayanagi, who died recently
and who was a pioneer in Japan in the study of the system of judicial review of the
United States, gave comment on the Supreme Court decision in the Sunakawa case
as follows:
The prosecutor adopts the interpretation that the court has no power of constitu-
tional review of treaties. This interpretation is supported by influential con-
stitutional scholars in Japan. I am skeptical on such interpretation. Apart from
the Sunakawa Case and in a view of long perspective, I think such interpretation
which makes the scope of judicial power too narrow would be dangerous.
Id. at 185.
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